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Abstract 
We extend Becker’s model of discrimination by allowing firms to have discriminatory 
and favoring preferences simultaneously. We draw the two-preference parallel for the 
marginal firm, illustrate the implications for wage differentials, and consider the 
implied long-run equilibrium. In the short-run, wage differentials depend on relative 
preferences. However, in the long-run, market forces drive out discriminatory but not 
favoring firms. 
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1. Introduction  
Becker’s (1957) theory is well established as the cornerstone of discrimination in economics, and has 
spurred the immense literature on this topic for over half a century. He models discrimination as firms’ 
distaste for interacting with certain groups of workers. Firms then act as if workers from that group 
would carry a wage premium, thus making them less attractive for hiring. The key result from Becker’s 
model is that it is the preference of the marginal discriminator—the firm that is indifferent between 
hiring from the discriminated group—that determines the wage gap, a powerful insight that helps us 
understand the interaction between markets and preferences both theoretically and empirically (see 
Charles and Guryan, 2009). One oft cited limitation of this model, however, is that it predicts that market 
forces will make discriminatory firms disappear in the long run. This prediction is not supported by the 
data. Building on Becker’s model, Goldberg (1982) has shown that the long-run wage differential can 
persist if firms have favoring instead of discriminatory preferences. The key difference is that favoring 
firms get non-pecuniary benefits from hiring their preferred workers and thus remain in the market even 
though they make lower profits.  
Both Becker and Goldberg assume that firms only have preferences towards one group. Conceptually, 
however, there is no reason to believe that discriminatory and favoring preferences are mutually 
exclusive (see e.g., Allport, 1954). And empirically, data from the US General Social Survey (GSS), 
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for example, suggests that these two preferences are not simply flipsides of one another; in the GSS, 
the correlation between the respondent’s expressed ‘closeness to Whites’ and their ‘closeness to Blacks’ 
is around 0.24, far from the -1 correlation that indistinguishable preferences would imply (Feld, 
Salamanca & Hamermesh, 2016, p.1505). Finally, for the formulation and evaluation of policies the 
difference between discrimination and favoritism can be essential. Hotly debated outcome gaps, such 
as the gender wage gap or racial gaps in criminal prosecution, are only differences in outcomes between 
groups that can be attributed to discrimination, favoritism, or both. Social suasion campaigns against 
favoritism or discrimination can therefore have varying degrees of effectiveness depending on the 
preference or combination of preferences that drive those gaps.  
A number of recent experimental studies have made remarkable progress in separately identifying 
discriminatory and favoring preferences. This is typically done by benchmarking outcomes using a 
comparison group towards which people feel arguably neutral, either because this group has no 
identifying characteristics (Fershtman, Gneezy and Verboven, 2005; Feld, Salamanca and Hamermesh, 
2016) or because the group’s characteristics are not recognizable (Jacquemet and Yannelis, 2012; Edo, 
Jacquemet and Yannelis, 2015). Using this approach, favoritism is identified as a positive treatment 
relative the neutral group, and discrimination is identified as a negative treatment relative to the neutral 
group. Importantly, the findings of this literature confirm that both favoring and discriminatory 
preferences co-exist, which raises the question: How do discrimination and favoritism jointly affect 
outcomes in the short- and the long-run? In this short note, we answer this question by extending 
Becker’s model of discrimination, allowing firms to have discriminatory and favoring preferences 
simultaneously. We draw the two-preference parallel for the marginal firm, illustrate the implications 
for wage differentials, and consider the implied long-run equilibrium.  
 
2. A Theory of Discrimination and Favoritism 
To model firms with both discriminatory and favoring preferences we keep to Goldberg’s (1982) 
notation and structure. Consider a firm that faces market wages 𝑊" for Blacks and 𝑊# for Whites, but 
acts as if the unit cost of labor were 𝑊"(1 + 𝑑") and 𝑊#(1 − 𝑑#), where 𝑑" and 𝑑#  are the 
“discrimination” and “favoritism” coefficients, respectively. The firm’s profit function is 
 𝜋 = 𝑄 𝐿" + 𝐿# −𝑊"𝐿" − 𝑊#𝐿# (1) 
and its utility function 
 𝑈 = 𝜋 − 𝑑"𝑊"𝐿" + 𝑑#𝑊#𝐿# = 𝑄 𝐿" + 𝐿# −𝑊" 1 + 𝑑" 𝐿" − 𝑊#(1 − 𝑑#)𝐿#	 (2) 
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where L represents employment, and 𝑄 is a well-behaved production function where the labor of Blacks 
and Whites are perfect substitutes. Following Becker, we assume that the discrimination coefficient is 
non-negative, and following Goldberg, we assume that the favoritism coefficient is non-negative and 
strictly smaller than one to ensure a finite demand for White workers. 
Because of the perfect substitution in production, the firm hires only Black or only White workers 
depending on which effective wage (i.e., the wage after considering both discriminatory and favoritism 
preferences) is lower. In particular, firms will hire only Blacks if 
 𝑊" 1 + 𝑑" < 𝑊#(1 − 𝑑#)  
and only Whites if  𝑊" 1 + 𝑑" > 𝑊#(1 − 𝑑#) 
We can thus express the condition for a firm to hire only Black workers as 
 𝑊"𝑊# = 𝑤 < (1 − 𝑑#)1 + 𝑑" 	 (3) 
where 𝑤 represents the ratio between Black and White wages. We assume that Black wages are less 
than White wages, so that 𝑤 < 1, a condition that holds in equilibrium.  
For a set level of relative wages which the firms take as given, the combination of preferences that 
would result in firms hiring Black or White workers in the short-run is depicted in Figure 1. Notice that 
in the figure Becker’s and Goldberg’s models are subsumed by movements on the y-axis and x-axis, 
respectively. Displacing the firm’s preference against Blacks on the y-axis (and thus taking 𝑑# = 0) 
shows that the firm starts hiring Whites when 𝑑" > 1/𝑤 − 1, or equivalently when 𝑊" 1 + 𝑑" > 𝑊#, 
the condition in Becker’s scenario. Displacing the firm’s preferences for Whites on the x-axis (and thus 
taking 𝑑" = 0) shows that the firm starts hiring Whites when 𝑑# > 1 − 𝑤, or equivalently when 𝑊# 1 − 𝑑# < 𝑊", the condition in Goldberg’s scenario. 
More generally, Figure 1 shows all combinations of discriminatory and favoring preferences of the 
firms that hire Blacks or Whites given an observed set of market wages. The diagonal line in the figure 
shows which firms are indifferent between hiring Whites or Blacks—the marginal firms. The figure 
also unpacks a surprisingly powerful insight: through it we can make sense of most apparent mismatches 
between firms’ preferences and their hiring decisions. In Becker’s scenario, where only discrimination 
matters, every firm that hires Blacks will have less discriminatory preferences than any firm that hires 
Whites. Goldberg’s scenario parallels this idea with favoritism. In our model firms will hire Blacks or 
Whites according to their relative preferences (1 − 𝑑#)/(1 + 𝑑") but, when focusing on a single 
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preference, it is perfectly possible that a highly discriminating (favoring) firm hires Blacks while a less 
discriminating (favoring) one hires Whites.    
 
Figure 1. Preferences for Whites and against Blacks and the Demand for White or Black Labor 
 
Labor demand, represented by the function 𝑅, the inverse function of 𝑄′, will also depend on both 
preferences. The simplest way to understand how labor demand evolves with both preferences is to first 
see how it evolves with each preference while holding the other preference constant. Figures 2 and 3 
illustrate these conditional labor demand functions.  
Reflecting the fact that 𝑑" acts as a wage premium, Figure 2 shows that labor demand decreases with 
discriminatory preferences among firms who hire Blacks. Analogously, Figure 3 shows that labor 
demand increases with favoritism preferences among firms who hire Whites. The flat part of the curves 
reflects the fact that, at a certain level of each preference, the hiring decision changes from Blacks to 
Whites. At that point the preference for the obverse group ceases to matter for the hiring intensity.  
It is also worth noting that both these conditional labor demands are continuous at every point, ensuring 
that the overall labor demand will also be continuous. This in turn results in a smooth production process 
without any discrete jumps in the entire domain of (𝑑#, 𝑑"). Importantly, this labor demand is 
continuous at the critical values where 𝑤 = (1 − 𝑑#)/(1 + 𝑑").1 
                                                
1 Continuity at these critical points, and the continuity of the utility functions that ensues, can be shown just as 
in Goldberg (1982) p. 310, footnote 3. 
𝑑" 
𝑑#  
1𝑤 − 1	 
1 − 𝑤 
BLACKS 
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Figure 2. Labor Demand as a Function of Preferences against Blacks for a given level 𝑑# of 
preferences for Whites.  
 
 
Figure 3. Labor Demand as a Function of Preferences for Whites for a given level 𝑑" of preferences 
against Blacks.  
 
Stemming from these preferences, the aggregate labor demands can be expressed as 
𝐿8 
𝑑" 
𝑅[𝑊"]	 
1𝑤 (1 − 𝑑#;;;;) − 1		 
BLACKS WHITES 
𝑅[𝑊#(1 − 𝑑#;;;;)]	 
𝐿8 
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 𝑅[𝑤"(1 + 𝑑")]𝑓(𝑑", 𝑑#)𝑑"𝑑#=#(=>?@)>=A=A  (4) 
 
for Blacks, and 
 𝑅[𝑤#(1 − 𝑑#)]𝑓(𝑑", 𝑑#)𝑑"𝑑#B=#(=>?@)>==A  (5) 
for Whites, where 𝑓 𝑑", 𝑑#  represents the joint distribution of favoritism and discrimination in the 
population of firms.2 
The equilibrium wages are a result of equating each of these demands with the respective labor supplies 
of Blacks and Whites, 𝑆#(𝑤#) and 𝑆"(𝑤"). As in Becker and in Goldberg, wages for Blacks and Whites 
are thus determined by the supply of Black and White workers and the firm’s preferences by solving 
the resulting 2-equation 2-unknown system. In contrast with Becker’s and Goldberg’s scenarios, 
though, the marginal discriminator will be defined by the relative preferences (1 − 𝑑#)/(1 + 𝑑") and 
not by either 𝑑"  or 𝑑#  individually. The increases or decreases in the preferences of the marginal 
discriminator will be governed by the joint distribution 𝑓(𝑑", 𝑑#) and unless this distribution is known 
we will not be able to map these changes to the separate changes in 𝑑"  and 𝑑#.3 
To understand how the profits and the utility of the firm behave as discrimination and favoritism change, 
Figures 4 and 5 plot them both against each preference while holding the other one constant.  
                                                
2 Note that with this parameterization of preferences the preference support that ensures strictly positive wages 
is [0,1) for 𝑑# and 0,∞  for 𝑑". This support bounds the limits on the integrals in (4) and (5). 
3 Note also that a wage gap cannot exist in equilibrium if there is neither favoritism nor discrimination. To see 
this, set db and dw to zero in Figures 2 and 3 and notice that, given a well-defined supply of Blacks and Whites, 
firms will want to hire either for a set—and equal—wage.  
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Figure 4. Profits and Utility as a Function of Preferences against Blacks for a given level 𝑑# of 
preferences for Whites.  
Figure 5. Profits and Utility as a Function of Preferences for Whites for a given level 𝑑" of 
preferences against Blacks.  
 
A few important features of the graphs are worth highlighting. First, profits are always decreasing in 
favoritism and discrimination, reflecting the fact that both preferences distort the profit-maximizing 
level of employment chosen by the firm. Second, the discontinuous drop in profits when the firm 
switches from hiring Blacks to hiring Whites further shows that discriminatory and favoring preferences 
𝜋,𝑈 
𝑑" 1𝑤 (1 − 𝑑#;;;;) − 1		 
𝜋"  
𝜋#  
 𝑈 
𝜋,𝑈 
𝑑#  
𝜋"  
𝜋#  
 
𝑈 
1 − 𝑤(1 + 𝑑";;;)		 1 
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damage profits by distorting the type of labor chosen too. Third, the firm’s utility is less than the profits 
when the firm hires Blacks, and exceeds profits when the firms hire Whites. This utility is continuous 
throughout the range of preferences and will play a key role in determining which firms are expected 
to survive in the long-run. Fourth, there is a level of favoritism above which the firm will have negative 
profits, and this level depends exclusively on the equilibrium wage for Whites. A firm with this 
preference will not survive, even in the short-run. 
Which firms will survive in the long-run? Following the argument in Becker (1957), laid out in standard 
labor economics textbooks (e.g., Ehrenberg & Smith, 2009, Ch. 12; Cahuc, Carcillo, & Zylberberg, 
2014, Ch. 8) and developed in detail by Goldberg (1982, p. 313), a firm survives in the long-run if it 
cannot be bought out and operated by another firm. For such a transaction to take place, the profits of 
the buyer firm have to be larger than the utility of the seller firm (assuming that there are borrowing 
constraints for firms). The intuition behind this is that the buyer needs to compensate the seller for its 
utility, which is determined not only by profits but also by non-pecuniary benefits or losses.  
With this framework in mind, let us categorize the transactions that would take place in the long-run 
based on Figures 4 and 5. Upon inspection of Figure 4 we can see that all firms with positive 
discriminatory preferences can be bought by a firm that does not discriminate. This happens because 
discriminatory firms will always suffer a disutility as long as they hire Blacks. When that disutility is 
large enough that they would rather hire Whites, their profits suffer from having to pay the higher 
equilibrium wages, which will hurt their profits. And, at that level of profits, they cannot acquire any 
other discriminatory firm. Therefore, in the long-run firms with discriminatory preferences should 
disappear.  
What about transactions amongst favoring firms? As shown in Figure 4, when discriminatory firms 
disappear the gap between the profits of favoring firms when they hire Blacks, 𝜋", and their utility, 𝑈, 
disappears with them. Figure 5 then shows that once that happens there will be no firm with profits that 
strictly exceed any other firm’s utility. Therefore, no transactions will take place amongst firms with 
any level of favoritism, ensuring that in the long-run firms of all levels of favoritism that make positive 
profits in the short-run can survive.  
The long-run results show that even though in the short-run a variety of preferences consistent with 
Becker’s discrimination and Goldberg’s favoritism can co-exist, in the long-run market forces will drive 
out discriminatory but not favoring firms, just as Goldberg shows. 
3. Conclusions 
In this paper we extend Becker’s model of discrimination and Goldberg’s model of favoritism to include 
both discriminatory and favoring preferences simultaneously. The model draws parallel definitions for 
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the firm’s utility, profit, and labor demand functions, extends the conditions for market equilibrium, 
and redefines the marginal discriminator in terms of relative discriminatory and favoring preferences. 
It also shows that in the long-run only favoring but not discriminatory firms can exist.  
The short-run dynamics of this model and the redefinition of the marginal discriminator in terms of 
relative preferences can yield useful insights for analyzing markets where market forces that drive out 
discrimination are not (yet) at play. Future empirical research can show whether discriminatory 
preferences, favoring preferences, or both, can best explain market wage gaps and outcome gaps that 
can be attributed to systematic differential treatment of groups. In particular, one could use measures of 
discriminatory and favoring attitudes, analogously to Charles and Guryan (2009), to see which model 
best explains wage gaps and how they have evolved over time. Together with our framework, this 
exercise can provide powerful insights into the role of employer preferences in determining wage gaps. 
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